Hegel's philosophy of law. by Brooks,  Thom
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
05 June 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Brooks, Thom (2017) 'Hegel's philosophy of law.', in The Oxford handbook of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 453-474. Oxford handbooks.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-hegel-9780199355228?cc=gblang=en
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a draft of a chapter that was accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the book 'The Oxford
Handbook of Hegel' edited by Dean Moyar and published in 2017.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
Thom Brooks 
Introduction 
G. W. F. Hegel was neither a lawyer nor primarily a legal theorist, but his writings make a 
significant influence to our understanding of legal philosophy. Hegel’s primary contribution 
is his Philosophy of Right although he provides us with important insights in other works, 
such as his Philosophy of History and even the Science of Logic. No survey of the history of 
legal philosophy is complete without Hegel. While there is no disputing his importance, there 
is disagreement about where Hegel’s importance lies. Scholarly disputes range widely from 
the view Hegel defends a theory of freedom to a philosophy of despotism.
1
 There is further 
debate about which view about the nature of law best fits Hegel’s legal philosophy. 
 I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of law is best understood as a natural law theory. But 
what is interesting about Hegel’s view is that it represents a distinctive alternative to how 
most natural law theories are traditionally conceived. Hegel’s philosophy is remarkable for 
providing an entirely new way of thinking about the relation between law and morality than 
had been considered before. It is the distinctiveness of his legal philosophy that has rendered 
so difficult easy categorising into standard jurisprudential schools of thought. There is little 
that is standard in Hegel’s innovative understanding of law. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with an overview of leading natural law 
theorists from antiquity to today. Natural law is a wide tent composed of diverse views, but 
virtually all endorse some view of what I call natural law externalism: the idea that we 
determine moral standards for judging legal systems outside of them. The following section 
argues that Hegel supports natural law internalism: this is the view that we assess legal 
systems using moral standards found within them. Our moral assessment of law is internal 
and not external. This represents an important divergence from the natural law tradition that 
Hegel pioneered. The following sections consider implications of Hegel’s jurisprudence for 
the relation of the judiciary to the public and his often misunderstood theory of punishment. 
Natural Law Externalism: Old and New 
Natural law is a large tent encompassing a wide array of theoretical perspectives. They are 
loosely bound together by a shared conviction that law and morality are interconnected: to 
say something is ‘law’ is to say something about its morality. Despite their many differences, 
natural law theories also understand the relation of law and morality in a particular way, as 
what I call natural law externalism. This is the view that we understand morality externally 
from the law and use our moral standard as an external measure of legal validity. This picture 
of the natural law tradition holds for most classical and contemporary natural law theorists. I 
explain this here in order to show in the next section that Hegel’s philosophy of law 
represents an important break from this tradition because it conceives of law and morality in 
a different relationship. 
Classical natural law is perhaps best stated by Cicero: 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from 
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wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions 
upon good men in vain, although neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sing to 
try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is 
impossible to abolish it entirely . . . there will not be different laws at Rome and at 
Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law 
will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that 
is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing 
judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, 
and by reasons of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes 
what is commonly considered punishments.
2
 
There are five central tenets of classical natural law that we can discern from this statement.
3
 
The first is that we can distinguish between ‘law’ and ‘true law’. This is the difference 
between what is merely legal and what should always be legal. For example, it may be 
considered merely legal in this sense that a contract can allow a specific number of work days 
during which it can be voided without penalty. It might be said that this is mostly a 
contingent matter because what is most important is the centrality of our consent to making 
any contract binding. Natural lawyers understand ‘true law’ as not a contingent or inessential 
matter, but something more perfect. Not all laws share the same status: while all laws are part 
of a legal system, some are more central and ideal than others. 
 A second tenet of classical natural law is that we can make the distinction between 
law and true law by using a standard of moral justice. This links with a third tenet: that law is 
more ‘true’ the closer it coheres with a standard of moral justice. So we can distinguish 
between law and true law by considering how well law satisfies a moral standard. True laws 
more perfectly embody moral justice and the merely legal occupy the opposite side of the 
spectrum. Morality is relevant for the study of law because it reveals how well the law meet 
standards of moral justice. Law should not be understood separately from morality and, more 
specifically, from a standard of moral justice. 
 Perhaps the greatest disagreement among classical natural lawyers concerns 
identifying the correct moral standard we should use in weighing up how ‘true’ our laws are. 
Most, if not all, follow Cicero’s comments above and identify true law as meeting some 
divine threshold. But where we should draw lines in confirming and applying these standards 
can differ virtually from one natural lawyer to the next.  
 A fourth central tenet of classical natural law is that the standard of moral justice is 
external and applied in our normative assessment of law. We are to consider first what should 
serve as a satisfactory standard of moral justice. Once this is identified our moral standard is 
to be applied to our laws to see how ‘true’, or morally just, they are. But the standard we hold 
the law to is external to the law. We do not look first to the law to see what moral standards 
may already be embedded. Instead, we consider which moral standard should the law satisfy 
and then apply this external to the law standard to judge how just our laws are. 
 A final central tenet is specific only to classical natural law theorists. It is that the 
‘true’ law is universally and eternally true. So for Cicero the most just laws are applicable 
everywhere at all times without exception: what is a true law for Rome will be equally true 
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for New York or New Delhi. This is the case whether we speak of the past, the present or the 
future: the most perfect law is perfect for every people and every age; it does not change over 
time. 
 Contemporary natural lawyers agree with many of these tenets. Specifically, they 
agree that a standard of moral justice should be used to consider how just our laws are. This 
standard should be determined first externally to the law and then applied in our assessment 
of the law. Contemporary natural lawyers are deeply divided over what should serve as the 
most satisfactory standard, but they generally agree on an important break from natural law’s 
classical tradition. This is that contemporary theorists do not tend to link the most just with 
the divine. One implication is that the majority may find a particular view of morality most 
justified, but few claim this supports the view that there is one and only one supremely just 
legal system everywhere at any time. 
 This can be explained partly by the enlightenment forming a clear transition away 
from the view of all true law as divine to the idea of just laws grounded in compelling 
reasons. This speaks to H. L. A. Hart’s definition of natural law as ‘that there are certain 
principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man-made 
law must conform if it is to be valid’.4 Contemporary natural lawyers give greater weight to 
the use of reason in justifying the best standard of moral justice to assess the law. 
 For example, consider two different and influential contemporary natural law theories. 
The first is the natural law theory of John Finnis. His perspective is more traditional than 
most today. For instance, he claims that through reason we can identify seven basic forms of 
the human good. These include goods such as knowledge, play and sociability.
5
 Each is 
discoverable through our practical reflection on what basic forms of the good we might 
possess. These goods are understood as things worth having for a minimally decent human 
life. We undertake this task first before considering its legal application. Once we have 
identified these goods this helps us structure our moral appraisal of law: ‘they lay down for us 
the outlines of everything one could reasonably want to do, to have, and to be’.6 So we 
determine basic forms of the good first and then apply then in assessing law. 
 Of course, our use of practical reasoning may lead us to consider different forms of 
the good from what Finnis identifies. Or we might disagree on how some forms come to 
serve as basic human goods. The points that I want to raise are, first, that our determining a 
moral standard is prior to our determining the relative moral justice of our laws and that, 
secondly, this standard is considered independently of the legal system we apply it to. Our 
moral standard is external to the law. Finnis is an example of one kind of what we might call 
natural law externalism, but so is Cicero’s because he has a view of divine justice first that is 
to then be applied to law.  
 Now consider Lon Fuller’s natural law approach as a second example of a 
contemporary natural lawyer whose view is compatible with natural law externalism in a 
different way. Fuller defends what he calls ‘the inner morality of law’.7 The inner morality he 
identifies is not, perhaps confusingly, a morality that is internal to the law. Instead, Fuller 
engages in practical reasoning to discover eight principles that he claims any legal system 
                                                 
4
 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 186. 
5
 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 85—90.  
6
 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 97. 
7
 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 42. 
ought to satisfy.
8
 These principles include the guarantee to ‘make the law known, make it 
coherent and clear . . . etc’.9 Fuller’s principles require legal systems to provide general laws 
that are publicly accessible and not retrospective. If any of his eight principles is not met, 
then Fuller says that this ‘does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all’.10 
What Fuller calls law’s ‘inner morality’ does not, in fact, emanate and develop from 
within a legal system. Law’s morality is grasped externally by reason in response to 
circumstances. Fuller illustrates the application of morality to law with the example of our 
visiting a former Minister of Justice in Poland. The Minister recounts how his government 
endeavoured to make the law clear and well known by its citizens, but unfortunately this 
came at a hidden cost that making laws more understandable ‘rendered their application by 
the courts more capricious and less predictable’.11 Fuller argues that we should balance 
adhering best we can to our moral principles in light of the changing circumstances that 
confront us. His is a project of determining these principles first and then applying them to 
the law as a standard for law’s moral assessment.12  
Unsurprisingly, Fuller refers to his approach as ‘a procedural version of natural law 
theory’.13 For this reason, he can be understood to offer a more formalistic model of natural 
law. There is much of interest in Fuller’s approach. One attraction is that his procedural 
approach attempting to flesh out minimal moral conditions that any just legal system should 
satisfy addresses the criticism faced by many natural law views that they are too demanding 
because they are only satisfied when people act like angels. But two key points concern us 
here. One is that Fuller identifies a standard of moral justice first – that is to be applied later 
in a moral assessment of the law. Our moral standard for judging the justice of our laws 
comes prior to the laws themselves. Secondly, this standard is determined independently of 
our legal system. 
In sum, this section provides important background about natural law theories old and 
new. Each accepts several tenets in common. They recognise some laws are more morally 
satisfactory than others. They claim this is to be determined through applying a standard of 
moral justice and, crucially, this standard is determined separately from the legal system to 
which it is applied.  
My point is not to argue that the moral standards used lack any basis in real life and 
always a product of speculation, but rather that the standards—however realistic or 
compelling—are not chosen on the basis of any particular moral standard found within a legal 
system. Instead, moral standards are determined externally to a legal system. Law and 
morality may be intrinsically linked, but they are also potentially separable. Natural law 
theorists may have different views on which moral standard is best, but most can recognise an 
immoral legal system as a legal system. Laws should aspire to compatibility with justice, but 
they can often fall far short. They remain law either way even if some are more morally 
meritorious and just than others.  
Hegel’s Natural Law Internalism 
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The natural law tradition is a diverse camp encompassing many different perspectives. The 
previous section argued that both classical natural law and the leading contemporary natural 
law theorists share something in common: they all argue for an external understanding of 
morality that we then apply to our analysis of law as a standard of moral justice. There will 
be divergent approaches to how this shared practice is conducted. Cicero argues we must 
grasp ‘true reason’ that is divine in nature, Finnis claims we should identify basic forms of 
the human good through reason and Fuller highlights moral principles that any legal system 
should embody. The point is each identifies a moral standard first and then applies it to law 
afterwards: we discern morality externally and then analyse law in light of this standard. 
This discussion is important because it underscores the distinctive break from 
standard natural law theorising that Hegel’s legal philosophy represents. While his views are 
correctly understood by most as consistent with natural law, the precise connection between 
Hegel’s views and the standard natural law tradition is overlooked or unnoticed: for most 
scholars, Hegel endorses natural law theory in an undistinctive way.
14
 But this conclusion is a 
mistake.  
The view that Hegel is an undistinctive natural lawyer is not shared by all 
commentators. Hegel’s legal philosophy has thought to belong to jurisprudential schools as 
diverse as the historical school of jurisprudence, Marxist legal theory, postmodern critical 
theory and transcendental idealist legal theory.
15
 This wide disparity of opinion is unique to 
Hegel. There is no similar disagreement about any other significant legal philosopher.  
This disagreement arises from the fact that Hegel’s legal philosophy does not fit 
traditional jurisprudential moulds. This is because it defends a novel understanding about the 
relation of law and morality that has gone unnoticed. In short, Hegel offers what I will call a 
view of natural law internalism.
16
 All natural law theorists claim law and morality are linked, 
but while traditional natural law theorists first determine moral standards to then be applied in 
an assessment of law, the natural law internalism of Hegel assesses law through moral 
standards arising within the law itself. This section presents why Hegel’s legal theory should 
be located with the natural law tradition—and why it provides us with an innovative 
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understanding of how law and morality should relate that offers a distinctive break from other 
natural law theorists. 
Hegel accepts a core tenet of natural law about law and morality. He argues: ‘To the 
Ideal of Freedom, Law and Morality are indispensably requisite’ (PH, 41). Law and morality 
are not independent of each other, but instead interdependent. This puts Hegel clearly at odds 
with positivists who claim our study of law is about rules where morality may play no part.
17
 
Like many traditional views of natural law, Hegel believes that law becomes more 
substantiated—or ‘true’ or ‘actual’—when it better satisfies a moral standard by embodying a 
specific form of normativity. Some laws are more valid and authoritative the greater they 
cohere with this moral standard. Hegel says that ‘what is law [Geist] may differ in content 
from what is right in itself [an sich Recht]’ (PR, §212). So what is lawful might not be 
rightful. Slavery is an example of this. For Hegel, slavery is both legal and unjust (LNR, §8R; 
PH, 99). Laws become less unjust the more they achieve a ‘realization’ (Verwirklichung) of 
‘Right’ (Recht) whereby the law better embodies justice (PM, §529). 
Hegel’s discussion of law plays on an ambiguity in his native German language using 
both Recht and Gesetz. Both words can be translated as ‘law’, but Hegel uses them in specific 
ways. He refers to law or a statute as Gesetz and reserves Recht for true law, or justice. Their 
difference is that only the latter is commensurate with justice. All other forms of positive 
laws (Gesetz) embody lesser forms of justice (Recht). They come together in the following 
way, Hegel says: ‘actual legal relationships presuppose laws founded on right [Rechtsgesetz] 
as something valid in and for itself’ (LNR, §109). The recognition of a law is to assume it 
embodies some measure of justice. We do not then presume our laws are inherently unjust. 
But it is a widely held concern that where laws are found to fall short of some compelling 
moral standard this requires laws to be changed or terminated.
18
 The discovery of unjust laws 
compels us towards making revisions so that our legal system moves closer towards justice. 
Hegel argues that our understanding of law must start from the law itself. He says that 
‘what is legal [gesetzmäßig] is . . . the source of cognition of what is right [Recht], or more 
precisely, of what is lawful [Rechtens]’. So we are not to begin our appraisal—moral or 
otherwise—of the law until we first have an understanding about the law. We should discern 
what is right from the raw material that is the law itself: in other words, justice springs forth 
from the law. Our normative assessment of law develops from within the law internally: what 
is right (Recht) is instantiated from within what is lawful (Rechtens) (PR, §3). Hegel says: 
‘Law is part of the existing state of things, with Spirit implicit in it’ (PH, 268). The law is not 
separable from its spirit. Our understanding of the law is therefore grounded in doctrine: it 
must be an account of ‘the present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which 
exists God knows where (PR, 20). Hegel sees his view of natural law as embedded in our 
practices.  
Hegel’s natural law internalism occupies an interesting, and even novel, 
jurisprudential space. Like legal positivists, his focus is on the law itself. Hegel does not 
                                                 
17
 See Hart, The Concept of Law and Matthew H. Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without 
Trimmings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
18
 This is a widely held view among the general public, but it is not commonly shared by most legal 
philosophers. While natural lawyers traditionally have dominated jurisprudence, legal positivism and legal 
realism are more popular among contemporary legal philosophers. This is not to say positivists and realists are 
unconcerned about injustice, but rather to draw attention to the fact that they share a different view about the 
importance and the place of morality in studying law. 
argue for assessing the law according to some standard that is outside and so external to the 
law. Hegel’s legal theory accepts natural law’s commitment to claiming that our 
understanding of law is intrinsically bound with our normative assessment of law. But we can 
now see that Hegel’s legal theory represents a distinctive break from this tradition insofar as 
only Hegel claims the normative standard for assessing law is to be found within the law 
itself.  
Hegel similarly understands legal development as an internal process. Robert Stern 
captures well how this should be considered: 
we can use here an “internal” notion of rationality, whereby it is rational to change 
from one outlook or theory to another not because the latter possesses the 
transcendental predicate of “truth” or “absolute validity,” but rather because it 
represents a resolution of the problems, incoherences, anomalies, inconsistencies and 
limitations of the previous scheme or theory, and so constitutes an advance on it, in 
relative, but not absolute terms.
19
 
This passage recommends a view about internal progress that speaks to Hegel’s idea of law’s 
immanent development over time. This legal progress is perhaps best understood as a series 
of resolutions, or inconsistencies and anomalies within the law. So the law does not simply 
‘develop’ per se, but develops through overcoming its own incoherencies. Hegel recognises 
that the law might instead appear to us as little more than ‘a collection without principle, 
whose inconsistencies and confusion require the most acute perception to rescue it as far as 
possible from its contradictions’.20 The law can look this way because of the contingencies 
about how it is forged. A state’s legislation is rarely a seamless, coherent expression of a 
particular moral perspective. Instead, it is more commonly a product of political compromises 
peppered with statements about judicial doctrine and the rule of law from the judiciary’s case 
law. These sources of law can sometimes be in tension, such as where an appointed judiciary 
finds unconstitutional—and so unlawful—legislation passed by elected representatives. 
Famous cases abound, such as Brown v. Board of Education ending segregation of American 
students based on their ethnicity.
21
 
The law resolves its own tensions and incoherencies arising from the law’s contingent 
existence through particular statutes, secondary legislation or authoritative case law. The law 
does this from within its own resources (PR, §216). Hegel says: 
the progress from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further 
determination of it, hence that which forms the starting point of the development 
remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it (SL, 71). 
The kind of progress that Hegel has in mind here is a progressive comprehension. In this 
case, our focus is a progressive comprehension of law. Our comprehension develops from 
within the law’s own normative content (PR, §31). Its beginning does not ‘vanish’, but our 
understanding of it does as we develop clearer insights into law’s normative content. 
Law’s internal development is a dynamic process. Hegel says that ‘the scope of the 
law [Gesetz] ought on the one hand to be that of a complete and self-contained whole, but on 
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the other hand, there is a constant need for new legal determinations [gesetzlicher 
Bestimmungen]’ (PR, §216, see §3R). In other words, the legal system is ‘complete’ insofar 
as a progressive understanding of its normativity need not warrant there be more laws 
imposed from outside itself. The law has all the resources it requires at the beginning for 
internal moral development. To grasp what shape this should take requires our looking more 
carefully at the laws we already have and not looking beyond to norms or laws we want to 
find. 
Hegel clarifies these points further: 
an advance of the analytic intellect, which discovers new distinctions, which again 
make new decisions necessary. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of 
new decisions or new laws [Gesetze]; but in proportion to the graduate advance in 
specialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. They fall within the 
already subsisting “substantial,” general laws, like improvements on a floor or a door, 
within the house – which though something new, are not a new house (PM, §529). 
Hegel’s point is that as we solve internal incoherencies within the law according to its 
normativity and not from some external source we be mistaken into thinking we have created 
new laws. This view is mistaken because we are not creating new laws, but newly 
discovering what is already lawful – the law’s previously unrecognised content. Hegel views 
the law as a seamless web. When we better articulate the law’s internal normative content, 
our understanding of law becomes richer as these determinations are made explicit. The law 
progresses through resolving internal conflicts and by filling apparent gaps. 
Law progresses towards justice. Hegel says that justice has its ‘existence [Dasein] in 
the form of law [Gesetzes]’ and not ‘particular volitions and opinions’ (PR, §219). Law 
develops into justice through our ‘cognition of what is right [Recht], or more precisely, of 
what is lawful [Rechtens]’ (PR, §212R). We fill gaps and overcome incoherencies through 
codification. Hegel assumes that no political community will construct a timeless, 
unproblematic legal system on its first attempt. Legal codes are everywhere incomplete 
although some are less finished than others (PR, §211R).  
A community’s development of law is ‘the work of centuries’ not to be completed 
overnight (PR, §274A). Our progressing our understanding of law towards justice is ‘a 
perennial approximation to perfection [Volkommenheit das Perennieren der Annäherung]’ 
we may never achieve fully (PR, §216R). Hegel does not claim there is any one set of laws or 
legal system that is everywhere ideal at all times. Philosophy, for Hegel, is ‘a peculiar mode 
of thinking’ examining ‘what is there before us’ (EL, §2; SL, 69). Philosophy allows us to 
better understand our past and gain insight into our present, but it is fundamentally historical: 
every individual is a ‘child of his time’ and ‘philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in 
thoughts’ (PR, 21). Any philosophical assessment is provisional and open to future revision 
over time.
22
 
Justice in Robes? 
Hegel’s understanding of natural law as a form of natural law internalism is a break from 
natural law’s traditional externalism. But is Hegel’s internalism preferable? 
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Natural law externalist theories expose themselves to the charge that they seek to 
impose a moral standard in determining law’s validity, but their standards stand in need of 
further justification. This presents natural law externalism with two problems. The first is the 
need to justify that moral standards should determine legal validity. It might be countered that 
laws are valid if approved through agreed procedures, but we can have unjust laws as valid 
laws. So what should serve as the appropriate moral standard? Natural lawyers are deeply 
divided over which is the most compelling. For example, Cicero might claim consistency 
with God’s commands, Finnis favours compatibility of basic forms of human goods and 
Fuller endorses our satisfying a threshold of his inner morality of law test to name but three 
different types of external, moral standards.  
The problem is not only that each natural lawyer may well defend either different 
moral standards or apply these standards differently, but more centrally that each understands 
the study of law through moral philosophy. This is a problem because there may be practical 
limits to how far moral philosophy can and should go in our working out a legal system that 
is just. One example is Immanuel Kant’s well-known division in his The Metaphysics of 
Morals between the doctrine of right where morality is relevant for forging and maintaining 
political and legal institutions and the doctrine of virtue where institutions become 
irrelevant.
23
 So even if we could agree a moral standard, there might be limits to its 
application in a legal system. But our focus remains on getting the moral philosophy right 
first: law might appear to almost get in the way of our enacting a preferred moral vision. 
Hegel’s natural law internalism rejects this approach. While he accepts that legal 
philosophy is about justice, the law is not an obstacle for achieving justice but instead the 
necessary instrument through which justice can be forged. The central focus of Hegel’s 
distinctive natural law theory is on the law itself as we try to grasp its own internal morality 
and foster it. So Hegel’s theory avoids the problem of our being divided over which moral 
standard is best before we come to first consider the justice of a legal system. Hegel’s 
concern is with making the law pure, not trying to work law into a purer image derived from 
outside it. 
However, Hegel’s avoiding this problem exposes him to another. This is the risk of 
misidentifying the ‘right’ (Recht) within a legal system. If law is to be morally developed 
from within, this requires our being able to correctly discern its inner morality. But we must 
do so in the absence of an independent criterion to avoid only ‘finding’ in the law what we 
were looking for in advance. 
This point can be illustrated by considering this process in practice. For Hegel, our 
knowledge about justice must focus on identifying ‘right’ (Recht) and not our mere personal 
convictions. This is because following our personal convictions causes our understanding of 
right to become tainted (PR, §309). No one person’s conviction of justice should prevail as 
we move towards a more communitarian, mutual recognition of the concept of right and its 
practical application in law (PR, §§144, 260). This entails that judges should ensure that their 
personal views should not interfere with the content of their legal decision-making for fear 
that their decisions would be rendered ‘arbitrary’ (Willkür) (PR, §211A). So courts should 
attempt to comprehend justice ‘in the particular case, without subjective feeling 
[Empfindung] of particular interest’ (PR, §219). 
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The issue is that there is no guarantee that our understanding of law accurately 
captures some important part of its internal morality waiting to be discovered rather than 
conjured from our imagination. Natural law internalism may represent a new understanding 
of natural law jurisprudence, but it suffers from an epistemological problem concerning our 
ability to identify correctly justice within the law. 
This simple illustration of the obstacles any judge has in identifying the internal 
morality of law helps make the point about the problem Hegel’s theory runs into, but it is 
inaccurate in an important respect. Hegel gives the public a key role in the administration of 
justice within the state. He held this view throughout his career and it can be found in his 
early writings as well: 
How blind are those who like to believe that institutions, constitutions and laws which 
no longer accord with men’s customs, needs, opinions and from which the spirit has 
departed, can continue to exist, or that forms in which feeling and understanding no 
longer have an interest are powerful enough to furnish a lasting bond for a nation 
[eines Volkes] (NL, 2). 
Our political and legal institutions lose some share of their moral legitimacy where they fail 
to accord with the community’s shared convictions about public justice. This legitimacy is 
not majoritarian, but has an ‘organic quality’ (PR, §302, R). It is key that any legal system is 
accessible to the public, but without the requirement of a majority vote.
24
 
 This view of the public and public justice are at the heart of Hegel’s defence of the 
jury trial.
25
 He says: 
knowledge [Kenntnis] of right and of the course of court proceedings, as well as the 
ability to pursue one’s rights, may become the property of a class [Stand] which 
makes itself exclusive . . . by the terminology it uses, inasmuch as this terminology is 
a foreign language for those whose rights are at stake (PR, §228R). 
Juries are important because they help ensure that individuals on trial are reasonably capable 
of understanding the proceedings and verdict. A defendant may well disagree with a jury’s 
decision, but he or she should be able to have some inkling about how the jury came to their 
view in the trial. This is because the defendant is much like his peers serving on the jury. The 
alternative is to leave the decision exclusively in the hands of the trained judge. Hegel finds 
this problematic because it can run the risk that the proceedings and verdict may be 
conducted in a way that is inaccessible to a defendant, especially one that lacks a legal 
background. In that case, legal justice would become disconnected from the community it 
serves. It is through letting the public decide judicial outcomes through the jury trial that the 
link between the community and its legal system are maintained.  
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 Nonetheless, letting juries determine outcomes may secure this link, but maintaining a 
connection between the public and their legal system is not necessarily the same as correctly 
identifying the morality internal to a legal system that should help guide how decisions 
should be made. My concern is that the two can easily come apart: the community’s pursuit 
of its own sense of right may move in different directions than a pursuit following a view of 
right determined from careful examination of existing laws. Hegel seems to believe the two 
work in tandem, but this is unclear. Nor is it obvious that the community’s pursuit of its sense 
of justice is coherent, or that the current legal system of any state has within it a discoverable 
and coherent internal morality. 
 Throughout his writings, Hegel was deeply critical of England’s common law 
tradition. Hegel argues that a people’s ‘customary rights’ will at first ‘be characterised by 
formlessness, indeterminacy and incompleteness’ when they are initially collected and set out 
in a legal code (PR, §211R). But then this legal code should progressively self-develop by 
making itself more explicit through codification. And yet England’s common law ‘is 
contained, as everyone knows’ in an unwritten form: this is the cause of ‘enormous confusion 
which prevails in England’ as ‘judges constantly act as legislators’ (PR, §211R). This is 
because it is they that help set out what the law permits in particular cases. 
 But it is unclear how strongly Hegel should criticise the common law system – 
notwithstanding his explicit rejection of it. This is because his argument for trial by jury – 
which originated in common law jurisdictions – supports the flexibility of the people giving 
expression to their sense of right. Hegel claims the law is living and evolving as it develops a 
conception of actualised right – it is not fixed or set in stone and so more fluid that the 
codified Roman law system prevalent in Germany then as now. Hegel cannot both defend the 
case-by-case working out of right performed by jury trials while rejecting the case-by-case 
establishment of legal precedents by judges because the latter ‘retain a certain particularity’ 
(PR, §211A).
26
 If working out how right can be understood concretely subject to revision and 
constant testing is how a people develop a more determinate sense of right, it is unclear why 
the common law cannot be used to achieve this end. 
 Hegel is also critical about the common law’s adversarial system. Here he is on more 
solid ground. Hegel says: ‘In the English legal system, it is left to the insight or arbitrary will 
of the prosecutor to categorise an act in terms of its specific criminal character (e.g. as murder 
or manslaughter), and the court cannot determine otherwise if it finds his conclusion 
incorrect’ (PR, §225R). In the adversarial system, prosecutors on behalf of the state 
determine which crime a defendant will be prosecuted for. They may be in error – and they 
might also engage in some brinkmanship prosecuting someone for a lesser charge that might 
be more certain to lead to a conviction. This is different from the German system of Hegel’s 
time where judges would lead courtroom deliberations and not lawyers for either side without 
engaging in plea bargaining. This criticism does seem consistent with Hegel’s legal 
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 Part of Hegel’s concern with common law trials is their creating case law. He appears to favour working out a 
legal system through a legislative process than through the courts. This might be explained by his 19
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 Century 
German view of the judiciary as a part of the executive branch: both the police and the judge applies universal 
laws to particular cases. A concern for Hegel is that he does not appear to accept that the finding in one case can 
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theorising because our goal is to determine what is right and not easier or more efficient paths 
to finding others guilty of offences – especially where they might actually have committed a 
more serious, but more difficult to prove, offence  
 In sum, Hegel defends a novel understanding of natural law that appears to avoid the 
problem of disagreement about which moral standard should be determined first and then 
applied to our normative appraisal of law as common with natural law externalism. However, 
Hegel appears to trade one problem for another. This is because natural law internalism lacks 
any guarantee that what we claim is law’s internal morality is not our ‘finding’ a moral 
standard we had been looking for.
27
 
Moreover, Hegel claims our discovering law’s internal morality is a decision that 
juries are well-placed to make because the determination of the application of justice in a 
particular case is their public conception of justice.  It is unclear that the community’s moral 
standard must be the same as law’s internal morality. If it were so, then we might discover 
law’s internal morality by looking more closely within ourselves without need of looking 
within the law. This would render natural law intenalism unstable, but we should recall that 
legal philosophy was not a major preoccupation for Hegel despite his importance for the 
field. Hegel’s philosophical outline and associated lectures may not illuminate some clear 
way out of this problem, but he does provide us with a new way of thinking about natural law 
and how the public can and should relate to justice.  
The Unified Theory of Punishment 
Perhaps Hegel’s most significant and yet overlooked achievement is his identifying what we 
might call the unified theory of punishment.
28
 In short, the unified theory is the view that 
punishment is neither retributive, a deterrent or rehabilitative; but, instead, it should be 
understood as bringing these different facets together. Thus punishment should not be seen as 
one or the other, but some combination of all three. This section explains what is distinctive 
about Hegel’s theory of punishment as a further example about the innovativeness of his legal 
philosophy more generally. 
Philosophers typically defend one of the three main theories of punishment: 
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. Retribution is the most popular of the three. It is 
generally understood as the view that offenders should be punished to the degree that they 
deserve for some immoral activity. Murderers should be punished severely according to 
retributivists because they deserve it on account of their moral responsibility for such an evil 
act and in proportion to the wrongfulness of their crime.  
Retributivists have traditionally accepted a ‘principle of equality’ whereby an 
offender’s punishment is proportionate to the corresponding crime.29 This principle does not 
necessarily entail an eye for an eye although some retributivists make statements in that 
direction.
30
 Instead, it is usually a claim about comparative values: that the value of the 
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 I have elsewhere argued that Hegel uniquely shares some core similarities with Dworkin’s legal theory. Both 
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 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:332: ‘whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the 
people, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal 
criminal wrong should be proportionally equivalent to the severity of punishment. For 
example, if someone has performed an especially grave crime like murder, punishing it with 
an equality of value need not require the death penalty although that is one possibility. But 
what is key – for the retribution as equivalence of value view – is that capital punishment 
would be justified not as an eye for an eye, but punishing a very serious crime with a very 
serious punishment. That murderers would be punished by death is more a coincidence than a 
requirement.
31
 
Hegel is widely thought to support retributivism.
32
 This common interpretation is not 
without some support in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel says that crime should be understood 
as an infringement of ‘the existence [Dasein] of freedom in its concrete sense – i.e. to 
infringe right as right’ (PR, §95, R). It is the infringement of right, of justice, that is wrongful 
about crime. This requires a ‘restoration of right’ through punishment to reassert right’s 
existence and confirm its importance (PR, §99). Hegel calls this ‘retribution’ with the 
important qualification of ‘in so far as [retribution], by its concept, is an infringement of an 
infringement’ (PR, §101). This means that crime is a violation of right because it attempts to 
negate it. In response, we should negate this negation: a crime is an attempt to violate our 
rights and so punishment is an effort to undo this wrongful activity. Punishment is not be a 
specific equality of like for like, but ‘an approximate fulfilment’ in value (PR, §101R). 
But this view of Hegel as a retributivist is flawed. One reason is that retribution 
presumes an account of moral responsibility and a legal system. We punish offenders because 
they have broken a law. However, Hegel’s discussion here is in the section ‘Abstract Right’ 
which is philosophically prior to the state and legal system. His claims about restoring right 
are specifically addressing the contractual stipulations arising through mutual recognition 
between self and other, not the more complex legal relationships citizens develop over time 
in the state. There is no law, no police, no courts and no prisons at this point in his discussion. 
This is not to say his claims about crime as a violation of right where punishment aims to 
restore rights is meaningless. It is rather a foundation claim about the ground of punishment 
that helps structure his more complete theory of punishment that develops beyond ‘Abstract 
Right’.  
There are already strong indications that Hegel’s theory of punishment departs from 
standard accounts of retribution even in ‘Abstract Right’. When discussing ‘retribution’ with 
the important qualification already flagged above that by this he means ‘an infringement of 
an infringement’ understood as a restoration of rights, Hegel says: ‘It is not the crimes or 
punishments which change, but the relation between the two’ (PR, §96A).  
This is crucial because retributivists generally accept a fixed relation between crime 
and punishment: the moral wrongness of one is linked to the other and this is a relationship 
that should not change if background conditions were different. Typically, retributivists like 
Kant were opposed to consequentialism and so context should not factor into which 
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punishment an offender deserves. But Hegel’s first break with retributivists is he accepts that 
context matters. Crimes may be public wrongs irrespective of circumstances, but they can 
make a difference into determining punishment. 
Hegel’s second break with retributivists is more explicit: he rejects the idea that 
punishment is no more than retribution. In a rarely quoted passage from his Science of Logic, 
he says: 
Punishment, for example, has various determinations: it is retributive, a deterrent 
example as well, a threat used by the law as a deterrent, and also it brings the criminal 
to his senses and reforms him. Each of these different determinations has been 
considered the ground of punishment, because each is an essential determination, and 
therefore the others, as distinct from it, are determined as merely contingent relatively 
to it. But the one which is taken as ground is still not the whole punishment itself’ (SL, 
465). 
These comments are crucial to understanding Hegel’s theory of punishment.33 They make 
clear that he does not believe we must choose to defend retributivism, deterrence or 
rehabilitation. Instead, each is a part of what punishment is about. The ground of punishment 
is retributivist insofar as an offender must deserve punishment for it to be justified. But the 
purpose of punishment as a restoration of right can take different forms, including as a 
deterrent or rehabilitative project, if that serves that aim.  
 This passage is also not the only place where Hegel makes such remarks. In his 
Natural Law essay, he argues: 
in the case of punishment, one specific aspect is singled out – the criminal’s moral 
reform, or the damage done, or the effect of his punishment on others, or the 
criminal’s own notion of the punishment before he committed the crime, or the 
necessity of making this notion a reality by carrying out the threat, etc. And then some 
such single aspect is made the purpose and essence of the whole. The natural 
consequence is that, since such a specific aspect has no necessary connection with the 
other specific aspects which can be found and distinguished, there arises an endless 
struggle to find the necessary bearing and predominance of one over the others (NL, 
60). 
This is a critique of our taking only one particular aspect about punishment as the punishment 
to the exclusion of others. Punishment is not one instead of another. Nonetheless, this thought 
is not obvious because different theories about punishment appear to clash at first glance. 
What an offender deserves may justify a very different punishment from what might best 
deter, for example.  
 This leaves open the question about how punishment might bring together retribution, 
deterrence and rehabilitation into a unified, coherent theory. While his comments indicate this 
                                                 
33
 Philosophers who want to deny the importance of this passage must either argue the Philosophy of Right’s 
discussion of punishment is incompatible with this explicit example from the Science of Logic – a text which 
Hegel clearly states several times informs and underpins the arguments of the Philosophy of Right – or that 
Hegel’s example in the Science of Logic is inconsistent with his theorising on grounds (and so must be 
incompatible with the Philosophy of Right on grounds of an false illustration of his Logic). It continues to 
surprise me that no other interpreter has picked up on this important passage, or even acknowledged it. I 
continue to be highly suspicious of counterarguments about Hegel’s theory of punishment claiming it is some 
version of retributivism where they fail to acknowledge passages like this that so explicitly state that was not his 
view. 
is his position, he is less clear about the specific shape this should take. This is perhaps partly 
due to the fact his comments on punishment are almost entirely in outline and require 
fleshing out.  
 Hegel leaves us some important clues. In the Philosophy of Right, he says: 
an injury to one member of society is an injury to all the others does not alter the 
nature of crime in terms of its concept, but in terms of its outward existence . . . its 
danger to civil society is a determination of its magnitude . . . This quality or 
magnitude varies, however, according to the condition of civil society (PR, §218R). 
The nature of crime at a conceptual is unchanged under different circumstances. In other 
words, murder and theft remain wrongful because they violate right and this is unaffected by 
context. It is in this sense that the ground is retributivist: all crimes are varieties of wrong at 
their heart.  
But context matters for setting the relationship between crime and punishment. Hegel 
is explicit: ‘it is not the crimes or punishments themselves which change, but the relation 
between the two’ (PR, §96A). For example, the more that civil society is threatened by crime, 
the more severely it will seek to punish it. So for Hegel crimes can be punished more or less 
severely over time because they are seen as more or less of a threat to society. Examples he 
gives includes times of war or civil unrest (PR, §218A). Crimes will be punished less 
severely during peace time than during a war not because the crime is conceptually different, 
but because we require a greater effort at restoring rights at such a time of conflict. Indeed, 
Hegel argues that as a state becomes more secure we should expect the death penalty to 
‘become less frequent, as indeed this ultimate form of punishment deserves to be’ (PR, 
§100A).  
The important point is that this is no retributivist view: context can greatly influence 
penal severity with circumstances influencing how problematic crimes are for society. Our 
individual desert for some action in the past might inform whether we have committed an 
offence. But it does not – by itself alone – determine how we should be punished. This is 
starkly different from traditional retributivist views whereby it matters only what someone 
deserves when punishing him, not whether it makes a society happier or more secure. Yet for 
Hegel the stability of society and its sense of self is a key factor in setting the severity – and 
perhaps even setting the criminal law.
34
 
 This leaves much to the imagination about how retribution, deterrence and 
rehabilitation might work together to act as a restoration of rights. There is some indication 
offered by the British Idealists, sometimes called the British Hegelians. These figures like T. 
H. Green, F. H. Bradley and others were heavily influenced by Hegel’s philosophy and most 
defend a similar view of punishment where retributivist, deterrent and rehabilitative features 
are combined into a unified theory of punishment. This may not be an accidental coincidence 
given the strong influence of Hegel’s philosophy, not least his Logic, on their work. 
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 If society felt no threat by the performance of certain actions, then what might have once been crimes might 
begin to lose their criminal character. For example, witchcraft might have been seen as a serious threat to the 
community and punished accordingly. But where it loses that character, its punishment evaporates until there 
may be no reason to think it a crime as it would not warrant punishment. 
 The British Idealists help us spell out a bit more how a unified theory of punishment 
might work.
35
 The Idealist T. H. Green says: ‘the justice of the punishment depends on the 
justice of the general system of rights’ and ‘the proper and direct object of state-punishment 
[is] . . . the general protection of rights’ (1941: §§189, 204).36 Punishment is about societal 
maintenance through the protection of rights. Crimes are rights violations that threaten the 
community and require a response to restore the public recognition of rights possessed by 
individuals.  
 This is spelled out further by the Idealist James Seth: 
This view of the object of punishment gives the true measure of its amount. This is 
found not in the amount of moral depravity which the crime reveals, but in the 
importance of the right violated, relatively to the system of rights of which it forms a 
part . . . The measure of the punishment is, in short, the measure of social necessity; 
and this measure is a changing one (1907: 305).
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We punish crimes because they are violations of our rights, and these rights should be 
restored through punishment. All crimes are rights violations, but some rights are more 
central than others and so require more punishment. Theft may violate my property rights and 
murder my right to life, but murder is more significant because violating this right ends any 
possibility of my enjoying this or any other right. 
 These perspectives flesh out a bit more what a unified theory of punishment might 
look like. Punishment must be deserved and its amount would vary depending on what would 
be required to maintain and protect a system of rights. This could warrant more deterrent 
punishments in some circumstances and more rehabilitative elements in others. Any clash 
between competing principles is governed by an overarching purpose of rights protection.  
This still leaves much more to be worked out and does not speak directly to individual 
cases. But it should be clear that Hegel has once again done something remarkable. He has 
offered us new insights into the nature of punishment and the possibility of a novel 
alternative, the unified theory of punishment.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a survey of some key ideas in Hegel’s philosophy of law. There is 
some debate about which jurisprudential school of thought best relates to his legal theory 
although most commentators view it as an unexceptional natural law theory. But this is 
untrue. Hegel’s uniquely creates a new distinction in the natural law tradition between natural 
law externalism and natural law internalism. The former represents most natural lawyers and 
it is the view that we are to determine a moral standard first and then apply it to the law to 
assess its overall justice. Hegel defends the latter and claims the moral standard we should 
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use to assess the justice of a legal system is located internally to it. We look to the law first 
and ascertain its moral development from within. 
 This perspective is not without its problems. It is unclear how we can be sure that the 
moral standards we discover are not read into our interpretation of law’s internal morality 
from outside. Nor is it clear how Hegel’s clear support for the public having a say on matters 
of public justice such as through the jury trial can perform the task of developing the internal 
morality of law. But Hegel nonetheless provides us with a new understanding of the natural 
law tradition that has escaped his predecessors and offers an important, and to my mind 
convincing, defence of the jury trial. 
 Hegel presents us with an innovative theory of punishment. Instead of the traditional 
view that penal theorists must choose between defending retribution, deterrence or 
rehabilitation, Hegel claims punishment is not one of them but all in combination. This opens 
his claim to the charge that these different theories clash with each other. But the key to 
unlocking this problem that was uncovered by the British Idealists inspired by Hegel’s work 
in the late 19
th
 Century was that these three can be brought together under a new framework 
of societal maintenance through rights protection—an analysis that is consistent with Hegel’s 
comments about punishment across his work. This has real contemporary importance because 
countries like the United States and United Kingdom use sentencing guidelines that bring 
together retributivist, deterrent and rehabilitative elements without a framework for 
employing them coherently. Hegel is the first to substantively contribute to the idea of the 
unified theory of punishment and it offers a promising perspective for rendering more 
coherent the sentencing guidelines in force throughout many countries today. 
 Overall, these are remarkable achievements for a philosopher who was not trained in 
law and did not set out to be a philosopher of law per se. Hegel’s work continues to inspire us 
with its rich insights into how we can better understand past thinking about key issues that 
still reap rewards for us today.
38
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